ABSTRACT In 2011, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v
I. INTRODUCTION
Medical monitoring is theoretically simple: a defendant that exposes persons to harmful substances must pay for periodic medical treatment to detect and mitigate latent diseases potentially caused by the exposure.
1 Yet, after nearly thirty years of decisions, 2 medical monitoring remains amorphous and unsettled. 3 As medical monitoring claims are most often brought in the context of mass exposure to toxins and harmful products, sometimes involving thousands of claimants, they inevitably intersect with procedural rules governing class actions. Although state courts are not bound by federal procedural rules, many states have class action rules nearly identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (Rule 23). 4 Because medical monitoring claims often involve defendants operating in different jurisdictions from the claimants they expose, diversity of citizenship implicates federal jurisdiction. Rule 23's procedural requirements will apply to medical monitoring claims based on state law. This is especially true after enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), which significantly federalized class action suits. The stringent analysis in Dukes is likely to impose significant barriers to class certification in federal courts. These barriers will be especially difficult to surmount for medical monitoring claimants who must navigate complicated causation issues in toxic torts, 10 and likely have no statutory remedy.
11 Part IV also discusses how Dukes has already affected the certification of a putative medical monitoring class in the Third Circuit and considers other outcomes for medical monitoring post-Dukes. Finally, Part V offers suggestions for how Missouri courts, litigants, and legislators should respond to Dukes to preserve medical monitoring for victims of toxic exposure in class actions in federal courts.
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II. MEDICAL MONITORING: POLICY AND LEGAL FOUNDATIONS
Anchored in tort law, medical monitoring most often arises in the context of mass exposure to toxins or harmful products, often in class action litigation. 12 At its core, medical monitoring allows plaintiffs exposed to toxic substances to recover the costs to detect, and thereby prevent or mitigate, latent diseases through ongoing medical testing and examination. 13 Thus, medical monitoring claims "are akin to [tort] claims for enhanced risks of future injury, except that they seek to recover the expected cost of preventative medical treatment necessitated by another's wrongful conduct rather than a percentage of the value of the ultimate harm expected to flow from [it] ." 14 Medical monitoring is necessarily tied to complex causation issues in toxic torts, and after nearly thirty years of case law, 15 J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 312 in conflict over its place in the law. In various courts, medical monitoring has been allowed or denied, premised on present physical injury or not, categorized as a claim or a remedy, and as legal or equitable. This section will attempt to explain this amorphous and complex legal issue.
A. MEDICAL MONITORING POLICY
Medical monitoring is anchored in tort law and the reason is simple: statutory remedies are often lacking for toxic exposure. The environmental regulatory regime in the United States is strong, but not all encompassing. For example, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act may help prevent toxic exposure through enhanced management and disposal oversight of solid and hazardous wastes. 16 And the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act establishes federal liability to ensure the prompt cleanup of hazardous waste once contamination has occurred. 17 Yet, these statutes leave the social costs of hazardous waste and toxic exposure unaddressed, forcing injured and exposed plaintiffs to seek redress in state tort law.
18 This is perhaps the strongest argument for allowing medical monitoring. 16 RCRA requires that "the generation of hazardous waste is to be reduced or eliminated as expeditiously as possible," and all waste generated "should be treated, stored, or disposed of so as to minimize the present and future threat to human health and the environment." 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b) (2006 J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 313
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However, toxic exposure is an extraordinarily complex area of tort law, particularly on the element of causation. 19 The plaintiff's exposure may have been caused by multiple, and sometimes indeterminate or defunct, defendants. 20 Plaintiffs may have widely varied durations and dosages of exposure. Some plaintiffs may be presently injured, while others are only at risk of future injury from exposure-related diseases with long latency periods. 21 Further, the risk of disease may depend on other environmental and individual issues, such as the synergistic effect of other chemicals, or a plaintiff's medical and genetic history. 22 Many of these issues are complicated 19 See, e.g., CRAIG ET AL., supra note 18, at 159. Historically, causation issues were not a large concern, but as toxic torts arose in the last half of the 1900s, "proof of causation has become one of the most complex and controversial aspects of tort liability." Id. Causation issues include: the division of the causal question into questions of specific and general causation, the relevance of the temporal order on the question of causation, the need for statistical evidence of the relationship between substance and disease . . . the existence of multiple defendants exposing plaintiff to the same substance, the long latency period between exposure and disease, the fact that the causes of many diseases are unknown, and the role of probabilistic evidence as proof of causation.
Id. at 165. 20 Id. at 230. With characteristic toxic torts like asbestos, claimants are often exposed to multiple defendants' products, exacerbating already complex causation issues. Id. As toxic injuries with long latency periods have increased, so have problems of identifying defendants, and the corresponding need to shift the causal burden to defendants when plaintiffs cannot determine which particular defendant caused the exposure at issue. Id. at 261. 21 See id. at 228-29 (discussing latency as a barrier to establishing causation); Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625-26 (1997) (noting the risk of conflict between asbestos claimants with present or future injury). 22 See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 430 (2d ed. 2000) (listing factors affecting individual exposure J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 314 by rules governing the admissibility of expert testimony, 23 and judicially imposed thresholds for the relative risk of disease a plaintiff must demonstrate to establish causation. 24 Given these causation issues, concerns of fundamental fairness, based in part on perceived conflicts between presently and latently injured plaintiffs, have fueled criticism of medical monitoring. Critics argue that a permissive medical monitoring policy may risk bankrupting defendants who are forced to pay for a costly, long-term medical monitoring program to detect future injuries, placing plaintiffs with present injury at a disadvantage and possibly leaving them without redress. 25 They further caution that due to the such as activity level, age, sex, and genetic make-up); CRAIG ET AL., supra note 18, at 219 ("Traditionally, unless a disease is a 'signature disease,' i.e., a disease known to be caused almost exclusively by exposure to a particular substance, there has been no way to distinguish between the causes of an ailment based on the ailment itself. . . . The emerging field of genomics offers hope" for linking the disease to particular toxins); Dafler v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 611 A.2d 136, 140 (N.J. Super. 1992) (discussing epidemiological evidence of "multiplicative or synergistic," as opposed to merely "additive," effects of asbestos and smoking on the relative risk of lung cancer).
23 See CRAIG ET AL., supra note 18, at 291 ("[T]oxic tort cases often turn on complicated testimony from expert witnesses. . . . [L]awyers often expend significant resources litigating the admissibility of such testimony."). 24 See id. at 202 (Many courts hold that "[A] plaintiff can prove specific causation by a preponderance of the evidence by providing epidemiological evidence that finds a causal relationship with a relative risk greater than 2.0; that is, people exposed to the substance suffer injuries at least more than twice as frequently as those not exposed."). J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 315 abundance of chemicals to which all Americans are exposed, medical monitoring risks opening the floodgates to litigation. 26 They warn that medical monitoring litigation, coupled with the inherent difficulties of managing a medical monitoring program, may unduly and unnecessarily burden an already overtaxed judiciary.
27
To address these concerns, some critics have proposed various limiting principles that should apply to medical monitoring. Critics urge that lump sum awards, which allow successful plaintiffs to do with their money what they choose, should be denied entirely. 28 Further, they argue courts should avoid double recovery in cases where an employer-provided or private insurance plan could pay for the necessary monitoring. 29 Moreover, critics contend plaintiffs should be required to demonstrate that a monitoring procedure actually exists which could detect latent injury, that the diagnostics and treatment are generally accepted in the medical community, and that monitoring beyond general preventative care is warranted given the relative risk of developing disease. 30 Critics have further posited that the disease for which monitoring is sought should be "serious," and there must be "demonstrated clinical value in the early detection and diagnosis of the disease." 31 In other words, if there is no treatment or cure, there can be no benefit from detection and diagnosis, thus rendering monitoring 26 Behrens & Appel, supra note 25, at 147, 151-52. 27 Id. at 144, 149. 28 Id. at 154-56 (noting that, in some cases, successful claimants have not used lump sums awards for medical monitoring); Schwartz et al., supra note 25, at 369-71. 29 Behrens & Appel, supra note 25, at 156. 30 Id. at 157-58. 31 Id. at 158.
J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 316 (1) the disease in question progressive asymptomatically following toxic exposure; (2) a diagnostic test with high sensitivity exists; (3) the exposed population has a relatively high prevalence of disease; (4) the diagnostic test therefore has a high predictive value; (5) the test is relatively low-cost; (6) medical monitoring could be integrated into standard clinical follow-up of those with disease; (7) monitoring could lead to early preventative care; and (8) Ultimately, the policy debate depends upon the societal choice of whether to place the burden of these costs on the defendants, or on the public as a whole, and the corresponding consequences of that choice to economy and health. This is a question perhaps better suited for the legislature than the courts. However, modern courts have taken on the challenge to a greater or lesser degree, creating a varied and interesting body of medical monitoring law in just a few decades.
B. MEDICAL MONITORING IN THE JURISDICTIONAL LANDSCAPE
Medical monitoring is extremely amorphous. Some jurisdictions do not recognize it at all. 36 Where medical monitoring is recognized, some courts impose a fairly uniform set of limits on its availability by requiring plaintiffs to prove the significance of the exposure and the necessity of medical monitoring. 37 Whether medical monitoring is an independent cause of action 37 See In re Paoli R. Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d at 852 (requiring plaintiffs alleging a medical monitoring cause of action to prove that: "1. Plaintiff was significantly exposed to a proven hazardous substance through the negligent actions of the defendant. 2. As a proximate result of exposure, J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 318 or merely a remedy is sometimes difficult to distinguish, and judicial analysis is often unclear. 38 In some jurisdictions, medical monitoring resembles an independent cause of action, with the anticipated costs of medical monitoring as the legally cognizable injury. 39 Consequently, in these "cause of action" jurisdictions, there need not be present physical injury. 40 Other jurisdictions refuse to recognize medical monitoring as a cause of action, but allow it as a remedy. 41 Where framed as a remedy, medical monitoring is most commonly plaintiff suffers a significantly increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease. 3. That increased risk makes periodic diagnostic medical examinations reasonably necessary. 4. Monitoring and testing procedures exist which make the early detection and treatment of the disease possible and beneficial. These factors would, of course, be proven by competent expert testimony."). 41 See, e.g., Badillo, 16 P.3d at 440 (noting that more cases recognize medical monitoring as a remedy than as a cause of action); Ayers, 525 A.2d at 308, 312.
J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 319 tied to an underlying negligence cause of action; 42 the remedy is merely "parasitic" on the underlying tort. 43 Within these "medical monitoring as remedy" jurisdictions, there is a split. Although seemingly antithetical to the preventative purpose of medical monitoring, some jurisdictions require present physical injury, 44 while others do not. 45 Because traditional tort law provides recovery for future medical expenses, labeling such relief "medical monitoring" is a misnomer:
46 It is not the "true" medical monitoring at the heart of legal debate, and will not be discussed further in this note. 47 The nature of the medical monitoring remedy may be legal or equitable. Some jurisdictions categorize medical monitoring as monetary, while others J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 320 categorize it as injunctive. 48 The nature of the remedy depends primarily on how the plaintiff frames the request for relief. In Day v. NLO, Inc. 49 the District Court summarized three distinct forms of medical monitoring relief and their corresponding remedial categorization:
First, a court may simply order a defendant to pay a plaintiff a certain [lump] sum of money. The plaintiff may or may not choose to use that money to have his medical condition monitored. Second, a court may order the defendants to pay the plaintiffs' medical expenses directly so that a plaintiff may be monitored by the physician of his choice. Neither of these . . . constitute injunctive relief . . . .
However, a court may also establish an elaborate medical monitoring program of its own, managed by courtappointed court-supervised trustees, pursuant to which a plaintiff is monitored by particular physicians and the medical data produced utilized for group studies. In this situation, a defendant, of course, would finance the program as well as being required by the court to address issues as they develop during program administration. Under these circumstances, the relief constitutes injunctive relief . . . .
50
Courts have framed medical monitoring within each of these structures. 51 However, the lump sum is disfavored and garners severe criticism as 48 (affirming a lump-sum jury verdict of $8,204,500 to plaintiffs exposed to toxins in well water, but cautioning that policy concerns weigh in favor of J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 321 54 Id. at 444. The Court did not fully explain which qualifications, if any, would render lump sum awards acceptable, and remanded the case, seemingly implying that the plaintiff could replead for non-lump sum relief. See id. at 455-56 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 55 Medical monitoring is also relevant to products (especially pharmaceutical) liability; the author limits this discussion to toxins primarily because of developments in Missouri's medical monitoring law. See Part III.C.
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A. CLASS CERTIFICATION UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 23
Courts apply a "rigorous analysis" to Rule 23. If any element is unsatisfied, the class may not be certified. 58 Courts have articulated three threshold requirements into Rule 23: 1) the class must be definable; 2) the representative must be a class member; and 3) the controversy must be live, not moot. 59 Once these thresholds are met, the proposed class must then satisfy four prerequisites under Rule 23(a): 1) the class must have "numerosity," such that joinder is impracticable; 2) the legal or factual questions must have "commonality"; 3) the claims or defenses of the class representatives must show "typicality" of those of the class; and 4) the class representatives and counsel must "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." 60 the class as a whole, while (a)(3) and (a)(4) focus on the class representatives, counsel and due process for unnamed class members.
61
After satisfying the four prerequisites, the proposed class must fit within one of four categories in Rule 23(b). First, (b)(1)(A) allows certification if individual litigation would risk inconsistent judgments, resulting in "incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class." 62 Second, (b)(1)(B) allows certification if individual litigation would prevent proposed class members not party to the litigation from pursuing, or adequately protecting, their interests. 63 Third, (b)(2) allows certification where the class opponent "acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate" for the whole class.
64 Subdivision (b)(2) was established with a goal of opening the door to civil rights class actions and expressly excludes claims for purely monetary relief. 65 Yet, a (b)(2) class may still be certified if monetary claims are merely incidental to claims for injunctive or declaratory relief.
66 Also, some courts imply a "cohesiveness" requirement on 61 See KLONOFF ET AL., supra note 59, at 61.
62 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A). This circumstance may arise when two individuals seek varying injunctive relief, making it impossible for the defendant to comply with both judgments. 63 Id. at 23(b)(1)(B). This situation often arises in "limited fund" lawsuits, where a large judgment against the defendant would leave it insolvent, thus precluding late-coming plaintiffs from relief. KLONOFF ET putative (b)(2) classes. 67 Fourth, a class may be certified under Section (b)(3) if common issues "predominate" over individual issues, and a class action is "superior" to other adjudicative mechanisms.
68 Section (b)(3) provides four factors for assessing predominance and superiority, with an emphasis on judicial economy.
69 Section (b)(3) allows for monetary relief; so to ensure due process, Rule 23(c) requires unnamed class members to receive notice and a chance to "opt out" of the class, in order to avoid preclusion of their individual money damages claims. 70 As Rule 23(c) does not provide a similar opt-out procedure for (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes, they are "mandatory," and individual claimants cannot generally escape class membership.
71

B. MEDICAL MONITORING AND CLASS CERTIFICATION GENERALLY
Medical monitoring claims are often brought as class actions, particularly in toxic exposure cases. 72 These claims are often removed to federal courts under federal diversity jurisdiction in part because of the nature expressing reservation whether any types of monetary relief could be "incidental" to injunctive or declaratory relief). 67 See, e.g., Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 143 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that the "cohesiveness" inquiry may be more restrictive than predominance under (b)(3)). But see Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1047 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting cohesiveness).
68 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 69 Id. at 23(b)(3)(A)-(D). These factors include the proposed class members' interests in individual litigation, the existence of ongoing litigation, the desirability of the particular forum, and the manageability of the proposed class. 70 See Martens & Getto, supra note 13, at 227. 71 
Id.
72 Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 12, at 1703.
J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 325 J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 326 Certification has been denied under both the implied "cohesiveness" requirement of (b)(2) classes, 80 as well as the "predominance" inquiry for (b)(3) classes. 81 Additionally, at least until Dukes, the tripartite recovery regime described in Day had obvious implications for class certification. Under the first and second Day categories, where plaintiffs request lump sums or defendant-supervised programs, the proposed class might be certified under (b)(3). 82 Under the third Day category, where plaintiffs seek an injunctive court-supervised program, the proposed class might be certified under J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 327 (1)(A) class seeking monitoring for nuclear exposure, distinguishing that, in In re Telectronics, medical monitoring was a cause of action instead of a remedy, and the defendant had created its own monitoring program so that any court order would affect the whole class). 85 The "limited fund" is particularly relevant where many plaintiffs suffer present physical injury in addition to those at risk of latent, future injury, creating a risk of inadequate representation by named plaintiffs or class counsel whose interests in representing one group may inherently conflict with the other group. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625-27. J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 328 in operating a lead smelter in Herculaneum, Missouri. 88 The smelter annually emitted large quantities of lead and other chemical by-products, thereby increasing the risk of lead and toxin related medical problems, which are especially harmful to children. 89 The plaintiff proposed a (b)(3) class of over 200 children, 90 alleging negligence, strict liability, private nuisance, and trespass as theories of liability. As to recovery, the plaintiff sought compensatory damages to establish a medical monitoring program for ongoing diagnostic testing to detect lead and other toxin related injuries or illnesses.
91
Meyer reached the Missouri Supreme Court after the District Court held, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that the proposed class could not be certified because individual issues would predominate over common issues.
92
On appeal, the plaintiff alleged the Court of Appeals erred because "its class 88 Id. at 714. 89 Id. 90 Id. The proposed class included all minors who lived in, or attended school or day care in, the "Class Geographic Area" for at least 12 months while under 6 years of age, and all minors born to mothers who lived in the Area for more than seven months of pregnancy, with eligibility capped at 168 months (14 years) of age. action analysis assumed incorrectly that a present physical injury is a necessary element of a medical monitoring claim," and the individualized issues the court addressed were relevant to personal injury actions, but not medical monitoring for class-wide toxic exposure to future injury. 93 The Court of Appeals purported to assume, without deciding, that a medical monitoring claim could proceed without present physical injury, yet it held otherwise. 94 In affirming the trial court's denial of class certification for lack of predominance, the Court of Appeals expressed its overriding concern that certifying a medical monitoring class without requiring present physical injury would prove too much, allowing generic causation to be determined without regard to the individual connection between causation and exposure. 95 The Court of Appeals identified nine individual issues 96 and determined that the "evidence would perforce need to be individual rather than common."
97
The Missouri Supreme Court reversed. The Court noted that "'wellaccepted' principles of Missouri law entitle plaintiffs to recover for the prospective consequences of a defendant's tortious conduct if the injury is 93 Meyer, 220 S.W.3d at 715. 94 Meyer I, 2006 WL at 4-5. The plaintiff also alleged "actual injury" from the smelter's by-products. Id. at 1. 95 Id. at 6. 96 Meyer, 220 S.W.3d at 719 (quoting Meyer I at 1). The issues the Court of Appeals identified included: the age at which exposure occurred, the nature of the exposure, the time period over which the exposure occurred, the blood lead level, the existence of other sources such as lead paint for any presence of lead, whether the individuals are presently suffering from any lead related injuries, whether the individuals are still being exposed or whether such exposure terminated, if the exposure to lead in Herculaneum has terminated how long ago it terminated, and whether there is any need for a particular individual to be monitored. reasonably certain to occur." 98 Guided by these principles, the Court determined that medical monitoring is not a new tort, but is "simply a compensable item of damage when liability is established under traditional tort theories of recovery." 99 Thus, under this formulation, medical monitoring in Missouri is not a cause of action, but a remedy "parasitic" on an underlying tort claim, and the remedy is monetary, not equitable. 100 However, the Court stated, "the theory of recovery for medical monitoring damages is that the plaintiff is entitled, upon proper proof, to obtain compensation for an injury to the legally protected interest in avoiding the cost of reasonably necessary medical monitoring occasioned by the defendant's actions." 101 This statement seems to conflict with the Court's notion that medical monitoring is a "parasitic" remedy, and instead resembles those jurisdictions where medical monitoring is an independent cause of action with economic injury as the legally cognizable harm.
102
Given its formulation of medical monitoring, the Court held that no present injury was required because "a physical injury requirement essentially extinguishes the claim and bars the plaintiff from a full recovery."
103 Thus, the Court of Appeals erred by applying factors "primarily relevant to a 98 Meyer, 220 S.W.3d at 717. 99 Id. personal injury action." 104 The Court then established a two-part test for analyzing predominance: first, a plaintiff must show "a significantly increased risk" of exposure-related disease, and second, that the "medical monitoring is, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, necessary" for detection and diagnosis of the disease. 105 Because the "common and overriding issue" in Meyer was "the common exposure to a set of toxins from a single source," the Court held the plaintiffs had satisfied the predominance requirement.
106
The only court to analyze a medical monitoring claim in Missouri postMeyer strictly construed its holding. In Ratliff v. Mentor Corp., 107 a products liability case, a federal district court held that, because Meyer was the only Missouri case addressing medical monitoring, and because "[f]ederal courts should not expand liability in diversity cases if the legal theory is 'not well established,'" Meyer only allowed medical monitoring in toxic exposure cases. 108 In Ratliff, as in Meyer, the named plaintiff alleged several underlying tort causes of action and sought medical monitoring as a remedy for the increased risk of "vaginal mesh" injuries from a product implanted in the pelvis to treat urinary stress incontinence. 109 As the issue was a defective J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 332 
ANALYSIS
In states like Missouri, medical monitoring is an important tool for plaintiffs who could not otherwise afford the diagnostics necessary to detect latent diseases caused by toxic exposure. Yet because many toxic exposures are mass torts, putative classes, which could be certified under state law, they may be decided in federal courts applying Rule 23. In Dukes, the majority of the Supreme Court conflated the previously "easily satisfied" commonality analysis under Rule 23(a)(2) with the more demanding "predominance" inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3) and applied a strict injunctive standard for (b)(2) classes. Part IV explains the Supreme Court's Rule 23 analysis in Dukes. Further, it briefly describes a recent Third Circuit case that denied certification for a putative medical monitoring class and relied in part on Dukes' holdings in the context of both (b)(2) and (b)(3). Finally, this Part provides an analysis of the likely downstream effects of Dukes on medical monitoring class actions generally, emphasizing the effects for Missouri.
A. WAL-MART V. DUKES: MUDDYING THE WATERS OF RULE
ANALYSIS
In a 2011 watershed decision, the United States Supreme Court decided Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 111 a massive employment discrimination class action case. 112 The proposed class sought certification under Rule 23(b)(2) and requested injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as punitive J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 333 damages and back-pay. 113 The Supreme Court held 5-4 that the putative class failed to satisfy the commonality prerequisite of Rule 23(a)(2) 114 and unanimously held that the class could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2).
115
As a preliminary matter, the majority stated that Rule 23 is not "a mere pleading standard."
116 Rather, satisfaction of the Rule's provisions is a factual matter to be determined under a "rigorous analysis" that frequently "entail[s] some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff's underlying claim." 117 In its Rule 23(a)(2) analysis, the majority declared that "commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members 'have suffered the same injury,'" and not merely a violation of the same law. 118 The majority further declared that the class members' claims "must depend upon a common contention" that "must be of such a nature that it is capable of class wide resolution, which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke."
119 As the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a "biased testing procedure," or "significant proof" of a general policy of discrimination, the majority found commonality lacking. 120 113 Id. at 2548. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's certification of the class, reasoning that individual backpay issues did not predominate over the request for declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 2550. 114 Id. at 2556-57. 115 Id. 116 Id. at 2551-52 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1982)). 117 Id. J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 334 According to the dissent's argument, the majority's holding is discordant with the plain text of Rule 23(a)(2), which merely requires that the class as a whole have at least one question of law or fact in common. 121 The majority's holding essentially conflated the commonality prerequisite with the more rigorous predominance inquiry under (b)(3), thereby "elevat[ing] the (a)(2) inquiry so that it is no longer 'easily satisfied,'" as it should be.
122 By mimicking the predominance inquiry of subdivision Rule 23(b)(3) in its (b)(2) analysis, the majority left "no mission" for Rule 23(b)(3), which was designed to test "whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation."
123 Particularly concerning is the possibility that the stricter evaluation meant for (b)(3) classes may now tacitly 121 Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, wrote that "[t]he Rule 'does not require that all questions of law or fact raised in the litigation be common," id. Despite the majority's conflated commonality analysis, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the proposed class could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2).
125 As a foundational matter, the Court emphasized the importance of the notice and opt-out provisions of Rule 23(b)(3) to due process when the relief sought is monetary instead of declaratory or injunctive. 126 The Court then dispensed with three different theories regarding the relationship between the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, and back-pay. First, the Court found it irrelevant that the back-pay claims were not the "predominating request." The Court gave no weight to the Advisory Committee's statement that subdivision (b)(2) "does not extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money damages," 127 and refused to allow (b)(2) certification where monetary claims are simply non-predominant or non-exclusive. 128 Second, the Court held that regardless of whether the claims to back-pay were "equitable" in nature, "[t]he Rule does not speak of 'equitable' remedies generally but of J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 336 injunctions and declaratory judgments." 129 Third, although the plaintiffs did not argue that back-pay was "incidental," the Court acknowledged that some courts have granted (b)(2) certification where monetary claims are merely "incidental" to declaratory or injunctive claims. 130 Although the Court did not decide whether any forms of "incidental" monetary relief are consistent with (b)(2) and due process, it held that the plaintiffs' back-pay claims could not satisfy the "incidental" standard in any case. 132 a case involving alleged contamination of air and drinking water by vinyl chloride, a carcinogen. 133 The plaintiffs sought certification of a proposed medical monitoring class under both (b)(2) and (b)(3). 134 The Third Circuit reserved the decision on whether monetary aspects of medical monitoring were "incidental" to injunctive relief under J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 337 Rule 23(b)(2). 135 However, it declared that "a (b)(2) class may require more cohesiveness than a (b)(3) class," and " [b] ecause causation and medical necessity often require individual proof, medical monitoring classes may founder for lack of cohesion."
136 Citing Dukes for the proposition that the "rigorous" class certification analysis often overlaps with the merits and (b)(2) classes must have "strong commonality of interests," the Third Circuit upheld the district court's merits review of expert testimony on exposure.
137
The plaintiffs presented expert testimony averaging the exposure across the class to demonstrate that monitoring was "reasonably medically necessary," but the Third Circuit emphasized that "evidence of hypothetical, composite persons" was insufficient for establishing cohesion. 138 Since the average exposure evidence was insufficient, and because the proposed monitoring could be harmful to certain class members, 139 J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 338 that a class-wide remedy could not be granted. 140 In the Third Circuit's view, individual proceedings would be required to assess the class members' medical histories and the "benefits and safety of a monitoring program."
141
Regarding Rule 23(b)(3), the Third Circuit asserted that the predominance and superiority requirements of (b)(3) "are less stringent than the cohesiveness requirement of Rule 23(b)(2)," 142 but rejected the plaintiffs' attempts to redefine an alternative (b)(3) class with more specific, yearly exposure evidence. 143 In denying (b)(3) certification, the Third Circuit cited Dukes' command that Rule 23 is not "a mere pleading standard," and a plaintiff must "affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule-that is he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc."
144
C. THE LIKELY DOWNSTREAM EFFECTS OF DUKES ON
MEDICAL MONITORING GENERALLY
As Gates demonstrates, proposed medical monitoring classes may quickly feel the effects of Dukes' heightened scrutiny without a change in law. Although there are limitations on the effect of federal procedural rules on state substantive law, 145 and states are not bound by federal procedural J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 339 J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 340 impediment to certifying any medical monitoring class. 150 Further, what is merely an impediment to the proposed class could prove an insurmountable barrier to individual litigants, leaving plaintiffs tortiously exposed to toxins with no effective recovery for costly diagnostics to detect and treat latent disease.
151
On the other hand, Dukes may not prove to be entirely the watershed case it initially appears to be. Under Rule 23(b)(2), it is possible that federal courts will carve out exceptions to Dukes' limitation on individual monetary claims "incidental" to injunctive relief, isolating that restriction to employment discrimination cases seeking individual back-pay claims.
152
Even if Dukes' strict injunctive standard is not construed as limited to employment cases, it will likely have little effect where medical monitoring is deemed injunctive. Yet it will still be relevant where, as in Meyer, the J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 341 plaintiff frames the request for relief as monetary. 153 Also, under Rule 23(b)(3), it is possible that federal courts applying Dukes' commonality analysis will in turn heighten their scrutiny of predominance in order to avoid leaving the requirement with "no mission."
154 However, it is more likely that putative (b)(3) medical monitoring classes will simply face the same hurdles they have historically, but just at an earlier time in the proceedings.
155
V. CORRECTING FOR DUKES: LITIGATION STRATEGIES AND JUDICIAL
AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
Given Dukes' heightened scrutiny of Rule 23(a)(2) and (b)(2), and the likelihood that federal courts will be the ultimate adjudicators of state medical monitoring claims, Missouri may wish to reconsider and revise medical monitoring to buttress its citizens' chances of recovery. Part V discusses various approaches Missouri courts, litigants, and legislators should consider. First, the courts should reaffirm existing interpretations of predominance and commonality, and clarify the limits of medical monitoring. Second, where medical monitoring is a remedy, as in Missouri, litigants should frame their request for relief as injunctive rather than monetary and avoid vague "equitable" language. Litigants should also consider framing medical monitoring as an independent cause of action rather than a "parasitic" remedy. Third, the legislature should consider framing medical monitoring as a "substantive" right.
J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 342 To the contrary, states may take an "all-things-considered, balancing inquiry," where a single common issue may outweigh many individual questions. 156 Likewise, in Missouri "[t]he predominant issue need not be 'dispositive of the controversy or even be determinative of the liability issues involved.'" 157 This proposition contradicts Dukes' imperative that, for commonality, which should arguably be a lower bar than predominance, determination of a common issue must "resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke." 158 Given the tensions between the federal and state class action inquiry, and the gaps left by the Meyer court, Missouri courts should take several steps to strike a balanced approach to medical monitoring. To protect J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 343 159 On the other hand, to protect defendants from unfairly shouldering the burden of medical monitoring for plaintiffs who may never manifest injury, Missouri courts should go beyond the two-part test in Meyer, which requires a plaintiff to show "significantly increased risk" of disease and that monitoring is "to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, necessary." 160 In addition to these fundamental elements, the courts should impose some of the limits proposed by critics of medical monitoring and adopted in other jurisdictions, such as requiring that the treatments and diagnostics are generally accepted in the medical community.
J o u r n a l o f E n v i r o n m e n t a l a n d P u b l i c H e a l t h L a w P a g e | 346 mitigating latent diseases. 171 Thus, medical monitoring is not substitutionary; it does not replace expenses already accrued or the estimated value of lost health, but rather provides specific relief for preventative medicine.
172 This specificity is a hallmark of injunctive remedies.
173
On this point, there is no logical reason to distinguish, as did the Day court, between defendant-supervised monitoring programs as "monetary," and court-supervised monitoring programs as "injunctive." 174 In each case, the defendant is required to act affirmatively to defray the costs of monitoring required by its tortious conduct, possibly resulting in significant costs to the defendant. 175 In a typical, non-toxic torts case, whether the presiding court simply issues an injunction requiring a defendant to act, or retains jurisdiction to supervise the defendant's actions, the fact is that in either case the underlying remedy is injunctive. In fact, courts often do not retain jurisdiction to oversee completion of their injunctive orders. 176 For example, in the 171 See Venugopal, supra note 13, at 1668-70. 172 See id. at 1667-68. Of course, the author does not consider lump sums in this analysis. 173 See id. at 1666. 174 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. 175 The mere fact that a remedy is costly to a defendant is irrelevant to the legal/equitable determination: injunctions often involve significant costs to defendants. In perhaps the most notorious example, the Supreme Court in Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) , affirmed an injunction of the construction of the Tellico Dam to prevent destruction of the endangered snail darter; when the case reached the district court, the Dam was 80% complete, and a permanent injunction would render unrecoverable $53 of $78 million TVA had already expended. Id. at 166. 
